In this article, we look at the current stage of Yemen conflict from 2021-2025, where the regional players have largely been displaced by the US and the war turned more brutal and the Yemen’s humanitarian crisis has reached a dire state.
2021:
The Trump Administration designates Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) while the successor, Joe Biden Administration revokes the “terrorist” designation of Houthis and announces the end of US support to the war. The “terrorist” pendulum swings back and forth.
Houthis intensify offensive to seize gas-rich Marib, the government’s last stronghold in northern Yemen. Marib hosts nearly one million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and intense clashes displace thousands more. Their missile and drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities, airports, and airbases continue.
Saudi Arabia retaliates with airstrikes, particularly in Sanaa.
According to UNHCR, from 2015-2021, the Saudi-led coalition had conducted between 20,500 and 58,500 airstrikes on Yemen as per the Yemen Data Project. A third of these airstrikes hit civilian structures like residences, hospitals, schools, weddings, farms, food stores, school buses, markets, mosques, bridges, civilian factories, detention centers and water wells. A military strategy that is eerily similar to that being carried out by the Israelis on Palestine. Can we conclude that this strategy must have had its think tank located in the West, perhaps?
And for PR, the UN and US envoys try for a permanent truce, reopening of air and sea links to Houthi areas, but the warring sides resist compromise. Saudi Arabia and Iran launch direct talks, mostly focused on Yemen.
Strikes and counter-strikes continue and escalate.
Government crack down on widespread protests across southern Yemen over the collapse of Yemen’s currency and lack of basic necessities, kills three protesters.
October 2021 –UNHRC votes against renewing the mandate for the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen (GEE), the only independent body monitoring all parties to the conflict. Saudi Arabia is accused of attempting to shut down the investigation, which in 2018 reported possible war crimes committed by all parties.
December 2021 – Due to decrease in international funding, the World Food Program (WFP) cuts food aid to Yemen. The cost of food increases dramatically and the humanitarian situation deteriorates. The Human Rights Watch estimated that about 80 percent of Yemen’s population requires humanitarian aid. By the end of 2021, the Yemeni rial reached its lowest-ever rate against the US dollar. External remittances shrank due to measures by Saudi Arabia, forcing thousands of Yemeni migrants to return. Along with all these, the restrictions caused by blockade on seaports and airports prevented adequate supplies from entering Yemen, hindering critical imports and aggravating the fuel crisis.
The loss of external remittances, Government revenues, commercial import restrictions and rising commodity prices increases poverty and unemployment in the population.
2022: Houthis extend missile and drone attacks to UAE after Emirati-backed local militias battle them in energy-producing Shabwa and Marib. Coalition warplanes pummel Yemen.
The US increases military support to its Gulf allies amid strained relations and intensified Houthi assaults on Saudi oil facilities.
President Hadi cedes power to a presidential council in April as Riyadh acts to strengthen the anti-Houthi alliance. Thereafter, Saudi and UAE promise $3 billion support for Yemen’s decimated economy.
GCC-sponsored talks in Riyadh begin without Houthis who wanted it held in a neutral country. Saudi Arabia announces cessation of all military operations in Yemen by March 30.
The warring parties agree a truce deal in April, which is rolled over twice and expires in October. But a tentative calm holds.
According to Human Rights Watch, while the truce was in effect, violations and abuses persisted, including killing civilians, arbitrary detention, forced internal displacements and restrictions on movement and humanitarian access to and from Taizz, Yemen’s third-largest city.
(Ref :https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/yemen)
The truce produced the lowest levels of deaths from political violence since 2015.
2023:
A Saudi-Houthi agreement is reported by international media in which Saudi Arabia agreed in principle to pay outstanding civil servant salaries in Houthi-run areas, including those of military and security personnel (why is Saudi Arabia expected to pay the salaries of Yemen’s civil servants ?) and to remove restrictions on entry points, including the ports of Hudaidah and Sana’a airport. In return, Saudi Arabia wanted guarantees that there would be no more attacks on its territory, the creation of a buffer zone along the border, an end to the Houthi blockade of southern ports, the siege of Taiz, and for direct Yemeni-Yemeni talks to follow any deal.
(Ref : https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/21871)
In March, Saudi Arabia and Iran agree to restore relations, raising hopes that the Yemen peace process could see progress. A China-brokered détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia was finalized in March, paving the way for potential Saudi-Houthi peace talks. In April, Saudi and Omani envoys visit Sanaa to negotiate a permanent ceasefire deal with the Houthis. The same month, Yemeni rebels and government forces exchange more than 800 detainees. The war was well on its way to end.
In South Yemen, falling revenues and expiration of a Saudi fuel grant in April precipitates an electricity shortage.
STC released a National Charter demanding that the southern issue have a special track, northern parties and forces have no role in the formation of the southern negotiating body, that talks be held in a foreign country, and that international actors, such as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the EU should act as witnesses to the final agreement. STC wants to be a vassal of the west, which may not be in the interest of Yemen while Saudi Arabia wanted direct Yemeni-Yemeni talks.
Houthi gunmen storm the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) in Sana’a following a dispute over price caps and overthrow its leadership, replacing them with their inexperienced people.
12-06-2023 – Aden Governor Lamlas directs officials to stop paying revenues to the central bank to protest against a lack of services like electricity, provided by the central government. But he is forced to reverse his actions later. The collapse of governance is quite visible.
20-06-2023 – Nearly 80 percent of power stations in government-held territories shut down due to lack of fuel.
01-08-2023 – Saudi Arabia announces US$1.2 billion in new funding for the internationally recognized government, to finance the public budget and support the Yemeni rial. On the 2nd, they send nearly US$267 million to CBY-Aden. Given the plight of Yemenese people, we need to question where these funds are being deployed – to pay salaries, create jobs, revive industries or pay military/militant forces & keep the strife going?
07-10-2023 – Israeli attacks on Gaza following Hamas attacks are condemned by both Yemeni government and the Houthis.
Now that the regional conflict has abated, Houthis turn their attention to Israelis via their trade route in the Red Sea.
23/24-10-2023 – Cyclone Tej brings torrential rainfall and heavy winds to parts of Yemen, resulting in loss of life, displacement, and infrastructure damage leaving thousands displaced, piling misery on the suffering population.
19-10-2023 – In the Red Sea, USS Carney shoots down 3 Cruise missiles and 8 drones launched by the Houthis, which Pentagon claims was headed to Israel.
Following Israel actions post-October 7, Houthis enter international headlines declaring war on Israel, bringing them into the bigger Middle Eastern conflict playing out in Palestine for nearly a century. According to Sana’a Centre for Strategic Studies, the Israeli military campaign against Gaza, and the Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping in purported solidarity with the Palestinians, effectively brought the Saudi-Houthi peace talks to a standstill, returned the Houthis to pariah status in the West, and allowed the STC to cast itself as a responsible member of the anti-Houthi coalition.
But STC’s push for an independent South to counter the Houthi-controlled North though supported by UAE was opposed by Saudi Arabia.
19-11-2023 – Houthis hijacked an Israel-linked cargo ship Galaxy Leader in the Red Sea and held 25 crew members hostage. Since then, the Houthis have continued to attack ships in the Red Sea route.
While Saudi-led coalition has scaled down their offensive in Yemen, their role has been taken over by the US and Israel, backed by EU. The US initiated Operation Prosperity Guardian with a coalition of 20 other countries, some of which remain anonymous. Saudi Arabia is notably absent, with Bahrain being the only MENA country.
Shipping firms Hapag-Lloyd and Maersk announce suspension of all container shipments through the Red Sea until further notice.
Meanwhile re-routing of commercial vessels around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa increased by 420 percent, adding up to 2 weeks and 6,000 nautical miles to their journeys. The shipping cost increased nearly four-fold, adding to consumers’ costs.
(Ref : https://africacenter.org/spotlight/al-shabaab-houthi-security-red-sea/ )
Al Queda and Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance forces revive activities; the latter opened their own airport in Al-Mokha with UAE funding, allowing them to receive weapons directly. Tareq is anti-Houthi, anti-Houthi-Saudi peace talks and has plans to take over the splintered GPC.
(Ref : https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/21871)
2024
The Biden administration re-designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).
STC leader Al-Zubaidi attends the WEF in Davos, where he publicly criticizes the Houthi action on Red Sea shipping. But just by being at Davos, he marked himself as a western proxy. In an interview, he exhorted the western coalition to take up ground operation against the Houthis in addition to the air strikes, promising his support if the US provided arms, training, and intelligence – effectively seeking to revive the war. Time and time again, we see parties in a conflict actively seeking to broaden and prolong the conflict using outside forces – this being one such case.
(Ref : https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/21871)
The conflict continues into 2025 along much the same lines.
For more details on these events please read my articles, Global conflicts under the radar – Part XXVI –Yemen & Global conflicts under the radar – Part XXVII –Yemen, which are available on half-yearly subscription.
